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ANTI-COMPETITIVE MARKETING PRACTICES 
IN THE AIRLINE INDUSTRY: A PUBLIC POLICY 
PERSPECTIVE 
Terrence J. Kearney, Chicago State University 
Richard Robinson, Marquette Univer.fity 
ABSTRACT 
Consumers, airlines and the economy as a whole have benefitted from airline deregulation. Government regulation was 
rep/aced by competition as the protector of the consumers. Airlines continue to pursue marketing strategies which reduce 
competition and as act as barriers to new entrants. This paper reviews some of those strategies and suggest actions by 
which policy makers might encourage competition. 
INTRODUCTION 
Since the deregulation of the airline industry, during 
the late 1 970s, consumers have benefitted from 
competition. It has been estimated timL consumers 
henefitterl in th~ IlmOllnt of about six billion dollars per 
ycar in lower fares. Most of tllls saving has gone to 
vacation travelers and to travelers in major markets 
(USDOT 1998). Business travelers have benefitted from 
increased flight frequencies. As air travel has increased, 
airlines have expanded and modernized their fleets. 
Operating efficiencies gained in the highly competitive 
domestic market have made U.S. carriers nearly 
invincible in international markets. (It should be noted 
that airline deregulation has also resulted in larger, more 
r.rowded aircraft, lower spending on in-flight food and 
service and crowded airspace resulting in delays.) 
The airline industry is rapidly changing. Most major 
U.S. carriers are focusing more on international flights 
than ever before (AIllk:rsun 1998a). Recent "open sky" 
agreements open new markets to U.S. flag carriers and 
allow foreign carriers more access to our international 
markets (Gourdin 1998). (Recent declines in the 
economies of the Asia rim and of Latin America have 
caused some carriers to rethink this move to dependence 
on international flights.) The NAFT A agreement has 
given Canadian and Mexican carriers increased access to 
U.S. markets (Kearney & Robinson 1993). 
Airline industry policy makers are faced today with 
marketing strategies and public policies which threaten to 
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reduce the level of competition in the industry. There 
needs to be a discussion of what level of competition is 
good for consumers, the airline industry and the nation. 
There also needs to be a discussion of what public 
policies need lu be adopLed Lo reach this level of 
competition in a changing world. This papcr will outline 
the various threats to competition and list some of the 
options policy makers might have available. 
The airline industry is important not only as an 
industry, in itself, but also as an industry which has a 
major effect on suppliers, customers and complementary 
industries. Low air fares and frequent service are 
prerequisites for much of the tourism and convention 
industries. Aircraft makers, food suppliers and travel 
agents depend on thc large volume thc industry presently 
enjoys. The industry is also important as an example and 
testing ground for policies being proposed in other 
industries. The international alliances described in this 
paper are similar to alliances being proposed or 
developed in such diverse industries as 
telecommunications, banking, insurance and fmancial 
services. The success or failure of this industry under 
deregulation could effect the deregulation of and the 
shape of such industries as local phone service, electricity 
and telecommunications. 
DEREGULATION AND COMPETITION 
Prior to deregulation, airlines were regulated by the 
Civil Aeronautics Board (CAB) in three major ways; 
market entrance, flight frequency and pricing. New 
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carriers were basically barred from starting operations. 
Existing carriers fmUld it difficult to add new city pairs or 
to change their frequency of service in existing markets. 
Prices changes had to be approved by the CAB and 
applied to all of the carriers in a market. Price discounts 
were limited and available only to groups such as 
students and military personnel. Airlines tended to 
compete on customer service elements, such as meal 
service, seat comfort and movies. The government 
directly subsidized service to a few small communities 
and indirectly subsidized service to many more by 
allowing high profit levels in major markets and requiring 
each carrier to serve some money losing smaller markets. 
Under deregulation, airlines were free to serve what 
markets they wanted, with flight frequencies they wanted 
and at the price they wanted. Most carriers adopted 
similar strategies in response to deregulation. They 
reduced or abandoned service to small unprofitable 
markets, and increased prices in those small markets they 
continued to serve (Kearney 1988). They decreased 
prices in major markets and entered new long-haul high-
density markets. Most carriers began offering discounts 
subject to complicated restrictions to differentiate 
business and non-business travelers. They also changed 
the service level they offered the consumer. They 
increased the number of seats per aircraft by reducing 
space between seats and the size of the seats, increased 
the load factor (percentage of available seats filled by 
paying customer), and reduced spending on meals and 
amenities (Kearney 1988). Most carriers soon started to 
build hub and spoke route systems to gain operating 
efficiencies and to ensure "on-line -feed" (continuation of 
passengers over connecting flight segments) (Meade 
1988). 
The strategies adopted by the major airlines did not 
insure success. While carriers had previously made 
money in long-haul high-density markets, high levels of 
competition brought price levels in these markets down. 
Travelers shopped for price and showed little or no brand 
loyalty. Rapid expansion strained airline finances. 
Within a few years of being deregulated, most airlines 
were losing money (Meade 1988). 
During the early days of deregulation, new carriers 
entered the market and some carriers which had 
previously been air taxi, regional, or charter carriers 
expanded their operations to become major airlines. 
Some were successful. Some were not. For the first time 
since the 1930s, airlines were allowed to survive or fail 
on their own. Some of the new carriers went under in a 
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matter of months; some old carriers entered bankruptcy. 
One problem that new entrants presented is that most 
operated at lower cost than their older, larger 
competitors, making price competition a threat to major 
carriers (Kearney 1988). 
By the mid 1980s, most carriers were adopting 
strategies which were designed to reduce the need to 
compete on price. Frequent flyer programs were 
introduced that tended to tie the most valuable customers 
to one carrier, creating artificial brand loyalty. A series of 
mergers created regionally dominant carriers and 
eliminated regional competitors (NorthwestJRepublic, 
TW AJOzark, USAirlPiedmont) (Kearney 1988). Other 
mergers were attempts to feed passengers into larger 
route systems (panAmlNational, DeitalWestern). 
Reservation systems were employed to give host carriers 
an advantage (Meade 1988). New carriers were denied 
access to airports under leasing arrangements between 
the airlines and the airport operators (Kearney 1988). 
CONTESTABILITY 
When airlines were deregulated, there was an 
expectation that competition would take the place of 
regulation in providing cheap, high quality service to 
airline passengers. The mobile nature of air transport 
suggested that no carrier would be able to dominate a 
market and reap monopoly profits. If prices were high in 
a market, other airlines would enter and compete excess 
profits away. Since it was assumed that airlines would 
have comparable costs of production, competition would 
provide reasonable, but not exorbitant profit levels 
(Bailey 1981). 
The mobility of capital investment was also assumed 
to provide "contestability," that is, the threat of entry 
would keep prices down in markets which were being 
served by one or few carriers (Baumol 1982). This is 
important in public policy analysis because policy makers 
are shifting away from looking at the number of 
competitors in a market, to examining the ease in which 
new competitors can enter the market. Carriers would be 
able to charge more, but not substantially more, in less 
dense markets which their competitors choose not to 
serve. 
These assumptions have been found to be, at least 
partially, wrong. Operating costs vary dramatically from 
airline to airline. New entrant carriers and those which 
have been through bankruptcy tend to have much lower 
operating costs than the older major carriers. This has 
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allowed some carriers to dominate individual markets. 
While these lower cost carriers have used price to gain 
control of these markets, there is little market threat to 
their ability to raise prices after gaining control because 
higher cost carriers know that they can't hope for a win 
or even a tie in a price war. Major carriers have resorted 
to buying or forming alliances with lower cost carriers to 
allow the major carriers to compete in lower density 
markets. These carriers often use code sharing (giving the 
smaller carriers flights flight numbers of the larger 
carner) and even name changes (American Eagle, United 
Exprcss) that disguise their status as entities scparatc 
from the parent company. 
The issue of contestability is a more controversial 
topic. Consensus among economists and policy makers is 
that airline markets are partially contestable; that is, 
carriers can enter new markets, but not with perfect 
freedom and often at a disadvantage to incumbent 
carriers. This allows higher than expected yields and load 
factors in many markets. The question for policy makers 
is what are the barriers to contestability (entry) and what 
can be dom: Lo remove or mitigate the effect of these 
barriers. 
BARRIERS TO CONTESTABILITYIENTRY 
Some entry barriers can be seen as natural. That is, 
that these barriers exist as part of the nature of the 
industry and there is little policy makers can, or should, 
do about these. Some of these natural barriers are: 
> The long tenn effects of advertising and marketing 
as an investment in name recognition and airline image. 
The cumulative effect of decades of advertising is a major 
advantage for incumbent carriers. Casual consumers 
know a few major airlines. While travel agents and 
frequent flyers might bc aware of new entrants and price 
or service advantages they might bring, less informed 
passengers are more likely to think of airlines they have 
known for years (Kearney 1988). 
> The advantage to being the largest carrier at an 
airport or in a city pair market. There is a relationship 
which has been documented for years between the largest 
carrier in a market and the load factor of that carrier. That 
is, the carrier offering the most seats in a market will 
receive a more than proportional number of paying 
passengers, all other things being equal. This is related to 
the factor described above, larger carriers are often 
carriers which have advertised in the market for years, 
but it also a function of flight frequency. The carrier 
which offers the most seats in a market usually offers the 
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most flights. The carrier which offers the most flights is 
most likely to offer a flight at or near the time of day any 
individual passenger wishes to fly (Keamey 1988). If 
consumers or travel agents are able to make convenient 
reservations with the first airline they investigate, they are 
unlikely to continue their search. Business travellers are 
likely to pay more for a more convenient time and are not 
likely to shop for cheaper fares at less convenient times. 
> Tht: mit: of inLt:rnaLional gaLeway flights and 
regional feeder flights in establishing airport and city pair 
dominance. Most airlines are still rt:gional. Tht:y Lt:nu Lo 
have their smaller markets concentrated in some parts of 
the country, even if they serve long haul markets to other 
parts of the country. Passengers prefer single airline 
service even if they have to change planes on a trip. The 
same is true of international passengers. They may have 
to change airplanes, but most prefer to keep the same 
airline through the trip. The feed of passengers from 
international and short haul flights give some airlines an 
advantage of a base level of business before they have to 
compete with other carriers in a market. This occurs at a 
natural level. It will be discussed below that some 
carriers have also tried to stimulate artificial levels of on-
line-feed through marketing strategies. 
Whilc thC barricrs listcd abovc arc naturally 
occurring, other barriers are the result of conscious 
planning. These attempts to create artificial barriers to 
competition have been implemented, in some cases, in 
spite of government concems. In other cases, these 
programs have been implemented with the active 
participation of government agencies. While there is little 
that can reasonably be done about the natural barriers to 
competition, discussed above, the artificial barriers are 
subject to regulation. These artificial barriers include: 
:> Fn:qut!Il.Lllyer programs. FrequenL flyer programs 
create artificial brand loyalty, especially among business 
travelers. The cumulative nature of the rewards (the 
more miles you have, the much more they arc worth) lead 
passengers to choose the airline with which they have 
mileage accounts, not the one offering the best deal. In 
the case of business passengers, when someone else is 
paying for the flight, there is a strong incentive to choose 
flights to maximize frequent flyer mileage credits. This 
moves the major carriers, especially the carrier with the 
largest presence in a given city, away from price 
competition and insulates them, somewhat, from lower 
cost carriers. 
> Travel agent commISSIOn overrides. It IS the 
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practice of airlines to pay a higher level of commission to 
travel agents who do more than a specified percentage of 
their business with that airline. Since most travel agencies 
are local, these overrides can create an advantage in city 
and city-pair markets for larger carriers. The travel agent 
is given an incentive to put passengers on the preferred 
airline, whether or not that airline offers the best price or 
service for the passenger. With the complicated nature of 
airline reservation programs, most passengers will never 
realize that they were misled by the travel agent. 
> Airport capacity restrictions. Some of the busiest 
airports (The airports that airlines most want to serve.) in 
the country are under restriction by the Federal Aviation 
Administration (FAA) as to how many flights an hour 
may land and take-off. With the increase in inter-national 
and freight traffic at these airports in recent years, the 
number of slots available to domestic, especially short-
haul carriers, is becoming even more limited. Since most 
of these slots are controlled by large carriers, it is difficult 
for other carriers to enter the market (Anderson 1998b). 
The government (FAA & DOT) has the power to 
reallocate these spots, but chooses not to do so; even 
allowing airlines to buy and sell slots as if they were 
private property. Even in cities with second airports 
(New York, Chicago, Washington), control of gates at 
the main airport is a major advantage. Improvements in 
air traffic control and movement of military, general and 
corporate aviation to secondary airports has offered a few 
more slots to airlines. Political pressure from various 
interest groups has slowed the awarding of new slots. In 
October of 1998, for example, Congressman Henry Hyde 
(R. n.) blocked the addition of between 20 and 100 slots 
a day being added at 0 'Hare in response to concerns of 
ills constituents concerning noise at the airport. 
>Airport gate leasing restrictions. Most U.S. airports 
have been built by local government bodies. These 
agencies often lack the capital to construct such large 
installations. The practice has been to have the airlines 
help finance these projects in return for control of a 
block of gates, or even a terminal. These lease 
agreements often extend for decades. The existence of 
these leases can keep new entrants out of airports, or in 
some cases, consign these smaller carriers to less 
desirable locations in the terminal (Kearney 1988). 
Airlines willch cannot get a reasonably convenient gate at 
an airport, operate at a competitive disadvantage. 
>Airline alliances & Joint marketing agreements: In 
recent years, airlines have begun to form alliances. The 
first of these were the local service carriers which became 
extensions of the larger carriers (United Express, 
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American Eagle). Tills was followed by international 
alliances between major carriers and major foreign 
carriers. The third form of alliances was domestic, in 
which major carriers allied with other (usually weaker) 
major carriers (Anderson 1998c, Gourdin 1998). The 
nature of the barriers presented by domestic and 
international alliances are described below. 
>Domestic alliances. The older of the two forms of 
domestic alliances, that between major carriers and local 
service carriers, has been around long enough to judge 
the results. These alliances started as a means of offering 
low cost service in small markets in order to compete 
with the low cost start-up carriers. The local service 
carrier would get the advantage of the name recognition, 
reputation and reservation support services of the larger 
carrier. The larger carrier would get some revenue from 
these markets, but, more important, would get the on-
line-feed from the smaller carrier. Tills was important in 
building strong dominant hubs. The through traffic could 
be kept on the parent airline through the use of code 
sharing. By extending frequent flyer mileage to 
passengers on the smaller carrier, more brand loyalty was 
built. The dominance that these arrangements helped 
build reached beyond the hubs to entire regions of the 
country. Barriers were created against competition in 
both the long-haul and short-haul markets affected by the 
arrangements (Anderson 1998b). 
> International alliances. The international 
alliances take the form of code sharing, frequent flyer 
program merger, schedule coordination and ground 
service. The purpose of these agreements is not only to 
reduce competition in international markets (though by 
the nature of international air commerce agreements, 
there are usually only two carriers in the international 
markets), but also to reduce competition in domestic 
markets (Anderson 1998A). In the agreement between 
UAL and Lufthansa, a passenger can make a reservation 
on a flight with a U AL flight number and fly from Des 
Moines to O'Hare on a United Express flight operated by 
a small, low-cost airline; transfer at 0 'Hare to a 
Lufthansa aircraft; cross the Atlantic and board a 
Lufthansa short haul flight from Frankfort to Hamburg. 
The passenger receives UAL Mileage Plus mileage for all 
three legs, has a single UAL flight number from Des 
Moines to Hamburg and may never set foot on a U AL 
aircraft. Lufthansa gets a passenger across the Atlantic 
and for the short haul in Germany, U AL might get the 
passenger on the return trip, but gets some revenue from 
the short haul trips to and from Des Moines. UAL 
strengthens its hold on O 'Hare for Domestic and 
International traffic. 
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>Cabotage restrictions. Across the world, with very 
few exceptions, nations restrict domestic air service to 
their own airlines. United or American can't cany 
passengers between Paris and Nice or between Hamburg 
and Frankfort. In most countries this is not a major issue, 
in that they have negligible amounts of domestic air 
travel. The u.s. domestic airline market represents over 
half the domestic air travel in the world. Foreign carriers 
have wauteu tu gain the right to continuation traffic on 
flights originating outside of the U. S. but serving more 
than one point in the country. For example, on a flight 
from Singapore to San Francisco to Chicago, the leg from 
San Francisco to Chicago would be a domestic leg. 
United (VAL) or Northwest (NWA) can pick up 
passengers in San Francisco bound for Chicago. Air 
Singapore cannot. An Air Singapore flight must travel 
half empty on the last leg. The U.S. based carrier has an 
advantage in both the International Market over Air 
Singapore and in the domestic market over domestic 
competitors. In addition a landing slot is being used in 
San Francisco and in Chicago, but no competitive 
pressure is being put on UAL or NW A. 
POLICY RESPONSES TO ANTI-
COMPETITIVE BEHAVIORS 
The anti-competitive strategies and constructs 
described above combine to result in an airline market 
that is not fully contestable. Airline passengers face high 
prices in some markets due to lack of competition. Entire 
regions of the country are dependent on individual 
carriers for service (as can be seen in the recent strike 
against Northwest Airlines). Policy makers have acted in 
the past to end, or reduce, ablJses of the airline 
reservation systems. They can act again to secure the 
advantage~ of competition for the flying pUblic. Wltile 
policy makers cannot do much about naturally occurring 
barriers, and cannot expect to wipe out all other anti-
competitive behaviors, there are some things that can 
increase, or at least reduce the decreasing of, competition. 
Among those actions are: 
>Increase the number of slots available at the busy 
airports, and allocate them with the intent of increasing 
competition. This could be done by simply refusing to 
award new slots to dominant carriers, or by requiring that 
airlines applying for new slots detail how those slots 
would be used to increase competition. 
>Subject airline mergers to strict scrutiny when 
those mergers would result in a significant reduction in 
competition, or require the merging carriers to divest 
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operations that would reduce competition. Any merger 
that would give the new carrier a dominant position at 
any major airport, or in major city pairs should be 
opposed, unless gates, slots, and flight frequencies would 
be given up to other carriers. Mergers such as TWA-
Ozark or Northwest -Republic have been allowed in the 
past ill SVite uf majur n:uuctions in competition and 
contestability. 
>Subject alliances and joint marketing agreements to 
the same scrutiny to which proposed mergers would be 
subjected. This should bc thc case both for domestic and 
international alliances. Since they behave much like 
merged carriers, they should be treated like merged 
carners. 
>Allow continuation cabotage for foreign carriers in 
markets that are deemed to be uncompetitive. When 
domestic carriers are not able or willing to challenge 
dominant carriers in domestic markets, foreign carriers 
serving one or both of the cities in the city pair should be 
offered the opportunity. The presence of, or threat of 
entry of an extra carrier coulu act tu restrain the dominant 
carrier. 
>Rcstrict the use of commission ovelTides for travel 
ugeIlL~, or at least n~qllire travel agents to infonn 
consumers of any override programs in which they 
participate. Full disclosure would remove some of the 
moral hazard faced by travel agents to give customers 
less than the best deal. Smaller carriers would be able to 
compete on an even basis. 
>Increase the number of gates available to smaller 
carriers at un-competitive airports. It will be difficult to 
change existing leases, but policy makers can restrict 
dominant carriers from acquiring new leases when other 
carriers leave and can pay attcntion to the interests of 
non-dominant carriers when planning expansions and 
renovations to airports. 
>Tax that portion of frequent 11yer awards stemming 
from business travel, paid for by the business. Ifbusiness 
travelers receive benefits from travel for which their 
employers have paid they should be taxed on those 
benefits as regular income. If business travelers had to 
pay income tax on their personal use of mileage awards, 
these awards would be less valuable. 
>Require airlines to disclose to whomever pays for 
a ticket, how many frequent flyer miles a passenger 
received using the ticket. Airlines have resisted 
disclosure, citing privacy concerns. In reality they are 
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concerned about theses programs becoming less powerful 
tools. If employers knew how many miles employees 
accumulated through business travel, they could require 
the employee to use the benefits for business travel. This 
would remove the incentive for the employee to make 
travel decisions on the basis of mileage, and remove the 
ability of these programs to shield the airline from 
competition. 
Policy makers should make the increase of 
competition a priority in the airline industry. There are 
affirmative policies, well short of a return to onerous 
regulation, that can make the industry more competitive. 
Some of them have been outlined here, but there are other 
actions that can be taken. Deregulation has benefited the 
consumer, the airlines and the complementary industries. 
The benefits of deregulation should not be lost to anti-
competitive marketing strategies. Policy makers have a 
duty to act. 
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